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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 5 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No- 890617-CA 
v. $ 
MARK DERON HARRISON, I Category No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of a second degree 
felony in the Third District Court. This Court has jurisdiction 
to hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(f)(1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Should this Court uphold the lower court's 
rejection of defendant's objection to the prosecutor's peremptory 
challenges because it was untimely or because defendant did not 
make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor had exercised his 
peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner? 
Objections to the jury must be made prior to the time the jury is 
sworn. State v. Bankhead# 727 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1986). To 
attack a peremptory challenge exercised by the prosecutor, the 
defendant must first establish a prima facie case. State? v. 
Cantu, 750 P.2d 581, 595 (Utah 1988). 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it 
excluded as irrelevant evidence of unconnected gang violcmce 
offered by defendant? The trial court has considerable 
discretion in deciding whether evidence is relevant. Bambrough 
v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286, 1290 (Utah 1976). The decision of the 
trial court to exclude evidence will not be reversed absent abuse 
of that discretion- Terry v. ZCMIy 605 P.2d 314, 323 (Utah 
1979). 
3. Was there prosecutorial misconduct during closing 
arguments that prejudiced defendant? It is not prosecutor 
misconduct to bring to the jurors' attention matters which they 
are justified in considering? and a case will not be reversed for 
prosecutor misconduct absent prejudice. State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 
483f 486 (Utah 1984). 
4. Did the trial court err in finding that defendant's 
fourth amendment rights were not violated by the search of a 
diaper bag in joint possession of defendant and his wife who were 
both arrested at the time of the search? The appellate court 
applies a correction of error standard to the legal conclusions 
of the trial court regarding search and seizure questions. State 
v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct, App.), cert, granted, 
P.2d (Utah 1989). 
5. Were the jurors properly instructed on the 
definition of the phrase "beyond a reasonable doubt?" Jury 
instructions must be construed as a whole and the trial court may 
select any instruction that is in proper form, correctly states 
the law and does not prejudice the defendant. State v. Johnson, 
774 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Utah 1989). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The text of all dispositive constitutional and 
statutory provisions is contained in the body of this brief or in 
appellant's brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with second degree murder 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990) (R. 9). A jury 
convicted defendant of manslaughter, a second degree felcm^fimmm 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1990) on August 18, 1989, 
in Third District Court, Judge David Young presiding (R. 151). 
Judge Young sentenced defendant to serve one to fifteen years in 
the Utah State Prison on September 15, 1989 (R. 152). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On April 8, 1989, Grant Glover, his brother Dino, their 
cousin, Larry Mosley, and friend Rodney Thomas went to the Caviar 
Club where they stayed until closing time and then moved on to a 
party at the Persepolis restaurant in downtown Salt Lake City (T. 
91-92). Grant Glover and Rodney Thomas were drunk (T. 96, 151). 
Defendant, his wife, and three friends also attended 
the party at the Persepolis (T. 190-91, 367, 372, 541-43). While 
they were dancing, defendant and his wife, Jacqueline Yazzie, 
argued with Rodney Thomas and Grant Glover (T. 93-94, 144-45, 
194-95, 378-80, 546-48). The bouncer told Grant and Rodney to 
leave the restaurant (T. 147). Afterward, defendant and his 
friends left the restaurant by the back door (T. 198, 380, 548). 
The four men, defendant, Terron Horton, John Bray and 
Damion Duncan, drove Terron's car to defendant's apartment where 
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defendant got out and went inside (T. 200, 385-86, 550). The 
other three men planned to continue on to Damion's house where 
they were going to retrieve a 12-gauge shotgun (T. 201, 384-85, 
549-50). According to John Bray, defendant was left at his home 
to retrieve his pistol (T. 200). Defendant claimed that he 
carried the pistol with him all evening in the waistband of his 
pants and that he always carried a gun when he went to parties 
because he had been threatened (T. 369-71, 424). 
When Terrori was driving towards Damion's house, Damion 
recalled that he did not have his keys to get into his house so 
the three turned around and drove back to defendant's apartment 
where defendant was standing outside (T. 201, 387, 549-50). 
Defendant got into the car and all of the men returned to the 
Persepolis (T. 202-04, 387-88, 550-52). When they arrived at the 
restaurant, Grant Glover and his friends were standing outside 
(T. 210-11, 552). Defendant and his group went inside the 
restaurant (T. 210-11, 389-91, 554). A few moments later, 
defendant's group came back outside (T. 95, 210-11, 389-91, 554). 
When defendant stepped outside, Grant Glover said some 
things that implied he wanted to fight with defendant (T. 96, 
214-16). They were facing off when Grant said "If you've got any 
beef[,] run up" (T. 114, 227). Meaning: if you've got a problem, 
come on (T. 114, 227). Earl Tucker said something about two 
gangs from California, Lynwood Crips and Compton CC's (T. 113-
114, 216). One of defendant's group, John Bray, wrapped a red 
rag around his hand preparing to fight (T. 218). A red rag might 
be interpreted to signify membership in the Bloods gang (T. 218-
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19, 402). A rival of the Crips (T. 216). Grant moved as if he 
were reaching for something and defendant took his .25 caliber 
pistol out of his pants pocket and fired (T. 226-27, 229, 404-05, 
558). John Bray described Grant's movement as "street 
bluffing" — attempting to convince them he had a weapon (T. 289-
90). Grant Glover was unarmed (T. 608-10). The bullet struck 
Grant in the right eye (T. 325). Grant fell back and did not 
move (T. 98). 
After the shooting, defendant and his friends ran tb 
defendant's apartment where defendant changed his clothes and 
left the gun on the coffee table (T. 516). John Bray said that 
defendant unloaded the pistol and disposed of the bullets (T. 
235-36). Defendant claimed that he did not unload it nor alter 
the ammunition in any manner (T. 412, 500, 516). However, when 
the gun was seized from defendant the following day, it was fully 
loaded, thus supporting Bray's claim that the gun had been 
unloaded and then reloaded (T. 312-13). 
Grant Glover died in the hospital five days after he 
was shot (T. 91, 341). The cause of death was the gunshot wound 
to the head and resulting complications including swelling of the 
brain and pneumonia (T. 331-32). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant waived any challenge he may have had to the 
State's exercise of its peremptories because his objection came 
after the jury was sworn. Even if he did not waive the 
objection, defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of 
race discrimination in jury selection because he never 
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established that the persons who he claims were prejudicially 
stricken were, in fact, members of a minority group. Also, 
defendant lacked standing to challenge the elimination of 
Hispanics from his jury because he is Black. 
The court properly excluded irrelevant evidence of who 
threatened defendant and that they had firebombed his car since 
defendant did not establish any connection between the persons 
who allegedly committed these acts and the victim. Defendant was 
not prevented from presenting his theory of the case because he 
testified that he had been threatened and that he carried a gun 
because of it. 
There was no prosecutorial misconduct that requires 
reversal of this case. Several of the claims made by defendant 
were waived due to nonspecific objections or the lack of 
objections. Other claims do merit reversal either because the 
matters were proper for jury consideration or because defendant 
was not prejudiced by them. 
The trial court properly admitted the gun that was 
discovered inside a diaper bag that rested on a stroller that was 
pushed by defendant and his companion when both were taken into 
custody. The search was contemporaneous to the arrests and was 
justified as a search incident to arrest. 
The jury was correctly instructed on the definition of 
the phrase "beyond a reasonable doubt." The instructions given 
by the court did not contain any of the language condemned by the 
Utah Supreme Court in recent cases. Even though the court 
rejected defendant's proffered instruction, there was no error 
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where the given instruction was proper and contained a correct 
statement of the law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REJECTED 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO THE STATE'S 
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES. 
Defendant claims that his conviction should be reversed 
because the trial court incorrectly concluded that the prosecutor 
had not exercised his peremptory jury challenges in a racially 
discriminatory manner which violated the Equal Protection Clause 
of the United States Constitution. He asserts that he 
established a prima facie case requiring the prosecutor to 
explain his challenges and that the prosecutor's explanations 
were not race-neutral as required by Batson v. Kentucky/ 476 U.S. 
79 (1986). This Court need not reach the issue of whether the 
prosecutor provided sufficiently race-neutral explanations 
because defendant did not properly preserve this issue below. 
In Utah/ any challenge to the jury must be lodged 
before the jury is sworn. Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-16 (Supp. 
1990); State v. Bankhead# 727 P.2d 216/ 217 (Utah 1986). See 
also/ People v. Harrisf 542 N.Y.S.2d 411 (A.D. 1989) (to be 
Defendant also claims that the prosecutor violated Art., IV, 
section 1 of the Utah Constitution by striking the two women 
because they were women. This argument was not raised below and 
should not be addressed. James v. Prestonf 746 P.2d 799, 801 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). The point is also not well-taken since 5 
women sat on defendant's jury and the prosecutor also struck a 
man from the panel. Defendant can show no prejudice from the use 
of the State's peremptories to balance the gender mix of the 
jury. 
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jury, or the last juror including alternates, is sworn). In this 
case, defendant did not object to the prosecutor's exercise of 
the State's peremptories until after the jury had been sworn (T. 
74). Thus, even though Judge Young heard the objection, his 
rejection of it can be affirmed because the objection was 
untimely. State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985) 
(Appellate court may affirm rulings of lower court on any proper 
ground) . 
This Court may also affirm Judge Young's ruling because 
defendant failed to establish a prima facie case. Defendant did 
not attempt to present any evidence supporting his claim of race 
discrimination. As explained by the Utah Supreme Court, under 
Batson, 
[t]he use of a peremptory challenge solely 
on the basis of race violates equal 
protection. The party attacking a peremptory 
challenge must establish a prima facie case. 
The burden then shifts to the challenged 
party to show the existence of a racially 
neutral reason for the challenge. 
State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989)("Cantu II"). And, 
[t]o attack a peremptory challenge under 
Batson, the defendant must establish a prima 
facie case by showing (1) that he is a member 
of a cognizable racial group, (2) that the 
prosecution exercised peremptory challenges 
to remove from the panel members of the 
defendant's race, and (3) that all the 
relevant facts and circumstances raise an 
inference that the prosecution used its 
peremptory challenges to exclude the 
veniremen from the petit jury on account of 
their race. 
State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 581, 595 (Utah 1988)("Cantu I"). See 
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. Judge Young did not find that defendant 
had established a prima facie case under Batson when he invited 
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the prosecutor to respond to defendant's objection and, in fact, 
defendant did not even attempt to establish a prima facie case. 
Defendant simply alleged that the prosecutor appeared to have 
stricken "the only two apparent or potential minorities on the 
panel, [which] appears to be a systematic exclusion of minorities 
. . ." (T. 75). This allegation does not satisfy defendant's 
burden to establish "that the prosecution exercised peremptory 
challenges to remove from the panel members of the defendant's 
race . . . ," Cantu I, 750 P.2d at 595, for two reasons. 
First, defendant did not establish that Ms. Gomez or 
Ms. Resendez were members of any racial minority. While their 
names appear to be of Hispanic origin, defendant did not 
recognize these people as being Hispanic when he raised an 
earlier objection to the jury panel claiming that there were no 
minorities on the panel (See T. 67). As defendant observed at 
that time, either woman may have acquired her Hispanic-sounding 
name through marriage or by some other means unrelated to her own 
racial heritage. Defendant did not present any evidence on this 
question, nor attempt to present such evidence. This Court 
should not speculate about the eliminated jurors' racial heritage 
absent evidence establishing it. See United States v. Anqiulo, 
847 F.2d 956, 985 n.38 (1st Cir. 1988)(failure to show eliminated 
jurors with Italian/American surnames were, in fact, 
Italian/Americans fatal to Sixth Amendment claim of fair cross-
section violation). 
Second, it remains an open question whether a defendant 
has standing to assert a Batson challenge where the stricken 
-9-
Second, it remains an open question whether a defendant 
has standing to assert a Batson challenge where the stricken 
jurors are not members of the defendant's own race. While dicta 
in Holland v. Illinois, 110 S.Ct. 803, 811-812, 813-814, 820-822 
(1990)(Kennedy, J., concurring; Marshall, J,, dissenting; and 
Stevens, J. dissenting), revealed that five members of the Court 
believed such a defendant has standing, this question is squarely 
presented in Powers v. Ohio, 110 S.Ct. 1109 (Feb. 20, 1990) 
(granting certiorari). See 46 CrL 3171 (1990). Since one of the 
five justices has now retired from the Court, it is not 
conclusive that the vote would remain the same. 
Other jurisdictions have held that a defendant lacks 
standing to challenge the prosecutor striking jurors who are not 
of his own racial heritage. See e.g. United States v. Vaccaro, 
816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Angiulo, 847 
F.2d 956, 984 (1st Cir.) cert, denied, 109 S.Ct. 314 (1988); 
United States v. Rodriguez-Cardenas, 866 F.2d 390 (11th Cir. 
1989); United States v. Townsleyf 856 F.2d 1189, 1190 (8th Cir. 
1988)(en banc); State v. Superior Court (Maricopa County), 157 
Ariz. 541, 545, 760 P.2d 541, 545 (1988)(en banc); State v. 
Gorman, 315 Md. 402, 552 A.2d 1203, 1209-10 (1989). See also 
Note, Due Process Limits on Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenges, 
102 Harv. L. Rev. 1013, 1018 n.37 (1989); Note, Sixth Amendment 
Reform of Peremptory Challenges — State v. Superior Court, 157 
Ariz. 541, 760 P.2d 541 (1988)(en banc), 21 Ariz. St. L.J. 327, 
333 (1989). For any or all of the reasons discussed above this 
Court should reject defendant's claim. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PREVENT DEFENDANT 
FROM PRESENTING HIS THEORY OF SELF DEFENSE. 
Defendant claims that the trial court prevented him 
from presenting his defense by excluding his evidence of gang 
violence and by not allowing him to read portions of the 
preliminary hearing testimony to the jury. According to 
defendant, the trial court violated due process and denied him a 
fair trial under the United States Constitution. In a footnote 
he also alleges, without analysis, that the Utah Constitution 
affords him "extra protection along these lines" (App. Brief at 
23, n. 14). This assertion should be ignored because it lacks 
analysis and because it was not raised in the trial court. State 
v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); James v. 
Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Before trial, defendant moved for a ruling in limine 
allowing him to present evidence that two months prior to the 
shooting, defendant's car had been firebombed by a Tongan-Crip 
gang (T. 356-357). The responsible individuals allegedly ran up 
to defendant's door and threatened his life on this occasion. 
Judge Young denied the motion because the evidence was too remote 
in terms of time, place and nexus to the shooting of Grant Glover 
(T. 361). The court noted that the fact that Tongans may have 
threatened defendant in February was not any reason for defendant 
to have perceived danger from a Black person in April, at a 
totally different location and under different circumstances. 
Defendant did not establish that any of the Tongans allegedly 
responsible for firebombing his car were present on the night he 
shot Glover, nor did he establish that there was any connection 
K^ 4-r.TMn tho Tnnoan orouo and Glover or Glover's companions (T. 
356-63). Defendant was allowed to testify at trial that he 
carried a gun for protection because he had been threatened (T. 
371). Essentially, Judge Young excluded the evidence of who 
threatened defendant and of the firebombing because it was 
irrelevant. Irrelevant evidence may be excluded by the trial 
court which has considerable discretion to decide what is 
relevant. Bambrough v. Bethers# 552 P.2d 1286, 1290 (Utah 1976). 
Absent an abuse of discretion, the court's ruling should not be 
disturbed. Terry v. ZCMI, 605 P.2d 314, 323 (Utah 1979). 
Judge Young's decision not to admit evidence of the 
Tongan firebombing, even if it was relevant evidence, was proper. 
The trial court could also have excluded the evidence under Utah 
R. Evid. 403. See State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 
1985)(Appellate court may affirm ruling of trial court on any 
proper ground). Rule 403 provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
A trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence under Rule 
403 will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. 
DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah App. 1987); State v. Cloud, 722 
P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1986); and State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 64 
(Utah 1983). Allowing this evidence would have confused or 
misled the jury and could have prejudiced the outcome of the 
case. There was some danger that the jury would have focused on 
whether the firebombing had occurred rather than upon the real 
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issue of whether defendant committed the crime he was charged 
with. The jury may also have been confused and misled into 
believing that there was some connection between the two 
incidents even though defendant offered no proof of a connection. 
Moreover, defendant was not denied the opportunity to 
present his theory of the case. Defendant testified that he 
carried a weapon for protection whenever he went out because he 
had been threatened (T. 371). During cross-examination, he 
stated: "after the things" that happened^ to me in the past I told 
a friend of mine about what happened so I acquired the weapon for 
protection." (T. 422). On direct examination, defendant also 
testified that he carried the gun all night on the night he shot 
Grant Glover and that he had returned to his apartment to change 
his shoes rather than to retrieve his gun. Thus, the jury heard 
defendant's explanation of why he carried the gun and heard 
defendant's claim that rather than returning home to get the gun 
in the midst of the disagreement with Glover and his associates, 
defendant had carried the gun with him all evening. Defendant 
was not prevented from presenting his theory and the trial court 
did not err. 
The trial court also did not err when it refused to 
allow defendant to read a portion of John Bray's preliminary 
hearing testimony to the jury. During cross examination of Bray, 
defense counsel attempted to impeach Bray with the preliminary 
hearing transcript. Counsel was unsuccessful in getting Bray to 
agree that his testimony had been inconsistent at that 
proceeding. Counsel, however, believed that the testimony was 
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inconsistent. Rather than going over Bray's statements with him 
line by line during examination, counsel sought to have the 
testimony read to the jury after Bray had been excused from the 
stand. This was not the proper method of impeaching the witness 
with his prior testimony. 
Judge Young did not allow the testimony to be read to 
the jury because he said that it appeared consistent rather than 
inconsistent with Bray's trial testimony as defendant urgssL 
When Bray's testimony at preliminary hearing on the issue of 
whether defendant said he wanted to go get his gun is read in 
context, it is confusing and difficult to comprehend. However, 
what Bray seemed to be saying at preliminary hearing was that 
defendant never told him that he had gotten the gun when he 
returned to the car rather than saying, as defendant claims, that 
defendant never told him he was going to get the gun. Because 
the trial court has discretion in determining what evidence to 
admit or exclude, there was no error in the court's refusal to 
allow the transcript to be read to the jury. Terry v. ZCMI, 605 
P.2d 314, 323 (Utah 1979). Rule 403 precluded the admission of 
the evidence because it would have been unhelpful and confusing 
to the jury. 
POINT III 
THERE WAS NO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN 
CROSS EXAMINATION OR CLOSING ARGUMENT. 
The Utah Supreme Court delineated the test for 
determining whether remarks by counsel constitute misconduct 
which requires reversal in State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422 (Utah 
1973). The court said: 
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The test of whether the remarks made by 
counsel are so objectionable as to merit a 
reversal in a criminal case is, [1] did the 
remarks call to the attention of the jurors 
matters which they would not be justified in 
considering in determining their verdict, and 
[2] were they, under the circumstances of the 
particular case, probably influenced by those 
remarks. 
Valdez, 513 P.2d at 426- The court, in State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 
483 (Utah 1984), further explained the second step of the Valdez 
approach. This step "involves a consideration of the caso**as~a 
whole." Troy, 688 P.2d at 486. Specifically, the Court said 
that, 
if proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the 
challenged conduct or remark will not be 
presumed prejudicial. State v. Seeger, 4 
Or. App. 336, 479 P.2d 240 (1971). Likewise, 
in a case with less compelling proof, this 
Court will more closely scrutinize the 
conduct. 
Troy, 688 P.2d at 486. The Utah Supreme Court has also long 
recognized that "[c]ounsel for both sides have considerable 
latitude in their arguments to the jury; they have a right to 
discuss fully from their standpoints the evidence and the 
inferences and deductions arising therefrom." State v. Valdez, 
513 P.2d at 426. See also State v. Lafferty# 749 P.2d 1239, 1255 
(Utah 1988); State v. Kazda, 540 P.2d 949 (Utah 1975). In Kazda, 
the Supreme Court said: 
It is our opinion that it is not only the 
prerogative, but the duty of either counsel, 
to analyze all aspects of the evidence; and 
this should include any pertinent statements 
or deductions reasonably to be drawn 
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therefrom as to what the evidence is or is 
not and what it does or does not show. 
540 P.2d at 951. The comments by the prosecution in closing 
argument in the present case fall within the Kazda rule. 
Defendant's claims are discussed specifically below. 
A. MARITAL PRIVILEGE 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor violated 
defendant's privilege to prevent his wife from testifying against 
him by asking questions of defendant about conversations with his 
wife and by remarking in closing argument that it was interesting 
that she was unavailable as a witness. Before trial, the 
prosecutor stipulated that defendant's marital privilege barred 
the State from calling defendant's wife (Jacqueline Yazzie) to 
testify against him. The prosecutor noted, however, that the 
State believed that it was not barred from referring to Ms. 
Yazzie's statements or conversations occurring prior to her 
marriage to defendant which occurred after the preliminary 
hearing. The marital privilege under Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(1) 
(1990) is twofold; the State cannot compel a spouse to testify 
and marital communications are protected from questioning. 
During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked 
defendant when he married Yazzie (T. 420, 501). By asking this 
question, the prosecutor did not impair or disparage either prong 
of defendant's marital privilege. The prosecutor proceeded by 
asking defendant whether his wife had ever told police that Grant 
Glover had a gun. The following colloquy occurred: 
Q You didn't tell Jacquie anything about the 
other guy having a gun, did you? 
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A Well, when I went to Damion's house and I 
was talking to my wife, urn, I didn't really 
talk to her really. I was just sitting 
there. 
Q I take it that you mean no* 
A No. 
Q You never told your wife about the other 
guy having a gun. 
A Well, afterwards, yes. 
Q When was the first time that you told 
Jacquie that the other guy had a gun? 
Ms. Loy: I will object to relevance, your 
honor, unless it's tied into this time period 
that is relevant. 
Judge Young: The objection's overruled. 
The Witness: The question? 
Q (By Mr. Cope) When was the first time 
that you told Jacquie that the other guy had 
a gun? 
A If I'm not mistaken I think I told her 
either the morning after she came over after 
the shooting or I told her the next day. 
Q Jacquie talked to the police, didn't she? 
A Yes, she did. 
Q And you read her statement, I suppose. 
A Yes, I have. 
Q And you've talked to her about it, isn't 
that right? 
A Talked to her about what? 
Q About what she told the police? 
A No. 
Q You haven't? 
A No. 
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Q You haven't talked to your own wife about 
what she told the police about the shooting? 
A What about it? I told her I knew she had 
talked to them. She went at the same time I 
did. 
Q Well, isn't it true that Jacqueline never, 
at any time, divulged to the police— 
[Defense counsel objected without specifying 
why and Judge Young allowed the prosecutor to 
finish his question.] 
Q. Isn't it true that Jacqueline never at 
any. time^ - toXd the police that .the other man 
had a gun? 
[Defense counsel asked to approach the bench 
and an unrecorded conversation occurred.] 
(T. 501-503). After defense counsel approached the bench, the 
objection, whatever it was, was sustained (T. 503). Although the 
objection to this question was sustained, the question does not 
appear to be improper on the ground that defendant claims on 
appeal, i.e. that it violated his marital privilege. While the 
prosecutor could not compel Ms. Yazzie to testify, he was not 
precluded from asking defendant what defendant told his wife 
about the crime or what he knew she had told police prior to the 
marriage. There is nothing in the record to indicate that 
defendant objected to this line of questioning based upon marital 
privilege. His only objection during this exchange was on the 
basis of relevance. His claim of misconduct was, therefore, not 
preserved. State v. Davis, 689 P.2d 5, 14 (Utah 1984) (defendant 
must have specifically stated to the trial court the same grounds 
for objection to evidence he presents on appeal). 
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Later, the prosecutor asked, 
Q. When you talked to Jacqueline on the phone she 
wanted to know what had happened, didn't she? 
(T. 507). The prosecutor withdrew the question when defense 
counsel objected stating that she thought the question violated 
the marital privilege (T. 507), but the prosecutor continued 
asking questions about conversations with Yazzie without 
objection (T. 507-509). Defendant never sought a ruling from the 
court that the,prosecutor had violated his marital privilege. Ho 
doubt defendant recognized that only marital conversations, not 
pre-marital conversations are protected by Utah Code Ann. § 78-
24-8 (1990). 
Several courts in other jurisdictions have observed 
that the marital communications privilege does not protect 
communications between spouses which occurred before their 
marriage. State v. Howard, 756 P.2d 1324 (Wash. App. 1988); 
State v. Dikstaal, 320 N.W. 2d 164, 166 (S.D. 1982); State v. 
Thompson, 413 N.W. 2d 889 (Minn. App. 1987); People v. Devita, 
517 N.Y.S. 2d 773, 774 (A.D. 2 Dept. 1987); State v. Williams, 
650 P.2d 1202 (Ariz. 1982); VIII Wigmore, Evidence § 2335 
(McNaughton rev. 1961); and McCormick, Evidence § 81 (2nd Ed. 
1972). 
Since defendant was not married to Jacqueline Yazzie 
when they conversed by telephone following the shooting of Grant 
Glover or when she was questioned by police, the questions did 
not violate the marital privilege. Further, these questions and 
others were asked of defendant in an attempt to demonstrate that 
when he talked to his friends immediately after the shooting, he 
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did not tell them that Grant Glover had a gun. The prosecutor 
was trying to demonstrate that the notion of a gun in the 
decedent's waistband was a newly formulated, hence arguably false 
claim. This was permissible in cross examination. Thus, 
defendant's claim that the prosecutor violated his marital 
privilege during cross examination fails even if it was not 
waived. 
Defendant also asserts that the prosecutor was guilty 
of misconduct during closing argument, when he discussed the jury 
instruction regarding the marital privilege. The prosecutor 
stated the following: 
Instruction No. 10. This is a very 
interesting one. 
["]A married person may not be forced to 
testify in any criminal action against 
their spouse." 
What's the assistance of that? Well, there 
is a preliminary hearing of this matter on 
the 17th of May and the defendant gets 
married in July. And the trial is in August. 
Isn't it interesting that one of the two 
people who got told about the gun in the 
waistband is the wife who can't testify? 
(T. 639-640). Although the trial court overruled defense 
counsel's objection, this comment was improper. In Utah, either 
spouse may invoke the marital privilege against compelled 
testimony in a criminal case. Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(1) 
(1990); Utah Const, art. I, § 12. In State v. Brown, 383 P.2d 
930, 932 (Utah 1963), the prosecutor's comment to the jury, that 
the defendant's wife, the one person who could have testified 
that defendant was home at the time the assault occurred, did not 
testify was prejudicial error. 
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Later, in State v. Trusty, 502 P.2d 113 (Utah 1972), 
the Utah Supreme Court observed, 
that any comment by the prosecutor which 
substantially impairs or disparages a claim 
of privilege is improper and therefore is 
error; and that if it be such that there is a 
possibility that it prejudiced the defendant, 
in the sense that there is any likelihood 
that there may have been a different result, 
then the error should be deemed prejudicial 
and another trial granted. But the converse 
is also true: unless both of those 
propositions are affirmatively shown, there 
should be no.such reversal. 
Id. at 114. In a footnote, the Court stated that the test is not 
the intent of the prosecutor in making the comment, but whether 
the comment was actually prejudicial to the rights of the 
defendant. Jd. at 114 n.3. 
In the present case, the State concedes that the 
prosecutor's comment "Isn't it interesting that one of the two 
people who got told about the gun in the waistband is the wife 
who can't testify?" was improper. However, the comment was not 
prejudicial because, as the prosecutor pointed out in the same 
portion of his argument, another witness who was allegedly told 
about the gun was also unavailable and there remains the fact 
that none of the other eye witnesses testified that Grant Glover 
had a gun. To establish that the trial court committed 
reversible error in this case when it overruled his objection to 
the comment, defendant must demonstrate that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that absent the comments the jury would 
have returned a more favorable verdict. Troy, 688 P.2d at 486; 
State v. Wilson, 771 P.2d 1077, 1080 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)(quoting 
State v. Bundy, 684 P.2d 58, 61 (Utah 1984). The question is 
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whether the prosecutor's comment deprived defendant of a fair 
trial. Under the circumstances of this particular case, the jury 
was not influenced by the remarks and defendant was not deprived 
of a fair trial. 
B. THE PROSECUTOR DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT AGAINST 
SELF-INCRIMINATION. 
Next, defendant asserts that the prosecutor's questions 
about his failure to mention, until he testified at trial, that 
Grant \Glover had a gun in his hand when defendant shot him 
violated his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination 
because it was a comment on post-arrest silence. Defendant's 
point is not well-taken. When the prosecutor asked if defendant 
had told the police about the gun, defendant objected to the 
question "on the same grounds as previously made" (T. 506). The 
only previous objection to a similar question was that it assumed 
that defendant would entreat others to tell the police that there 
was a gun (T. 505). That objection was sustained. Defendant 
cannot now claim on appeal that the real objection was that this 
was a comment on post-arrest silence where that objection was not 
made in the trial court. State v. Davis, 689 P.2d 5, 14 (Utah 
1984) (defendant must have specifically objected in lower court 
on same grounds raised on appeal). 
Furthermore, this question would probably not have been 
understood by the jury as a comment on post-arrest silence. A 
prosecutor commits error where a defendant does not testify only 
if his comment was "manifestly intended or [is] of such character 
that a jury would naturally and necessarily construe it to amount 
to a comment on the failure of the accused to testify." State v. 
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Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 1291 (Utah 1982) (quoting State v. 
Nomeland, 581 P.2d 1010, 1011 (Utah 1978); and State v. 
Jefferson, 116 R.I. 124, 137, 353 A.2d 190, 198 (1976)). This 
same principle should logically apply where the defendant does 
testify. Under the circumstances of this case, the prosecutor 
did not err. Defendant admitted that he had spoken to several 
people about the shooting and that he knew none of them had told 
the police that Glover had a gun (T. 501, 502, 504-505, 508). 
The jury most likely did not think anything about defendant 
having invoked his right to remain silent since there was no 
mention of him having done so and only testimony that he did 
speak to several people about the shooting. 
During closing argument, the prosecutor noted that the 
State was not told by anyone prior to trial that Grant Glover had 
a gun: 
The most incredible story, the added detail 
of the chrome plated revolver that he saw so 
well from a distance of 15 feet sticking out 
of the waistband of the dead man. Waistband? 
Waistband? On a dark end street with some 
back lit things from the Persepolis 
restaurant? He's so sure he saw that that 
he's willing to kill a man. No, that's an 
added detail. He made that up later. He 
never tells anybody about that. 
(T. 647-648). Defense counsel objected and "indicatfedj the 
court's instruction upon his comments to remain silent" (T. 648). 
Judge Young overruled defense counsel's objection because the 
prosecutor was talking about the witness's testimony (T. 648). 
The trial court also noted that by testifying, defendant had 
waived his right against self-incrimination (T. 648). Defendant 
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contends that the prosecutor's references to defendant's failure 
to relate his exculpatory story before trial violated his right 
to a fair trial. Defendant relies on Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 
(1976); Wainwriqht v. Greenfield, 475 U.S. 284, 292 (1986); State 
v. Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146 (Utah 1981); and State v. Bartley, 784 
P.2d 1231 (Utah App. 1989). 
The United States Supreme Court in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 
U.S. 610 (1976), said, "We hold that the use for impeachment 
purposes of petitioners' silence, at the time of arrest and after 
receiving Miranda warnings, violated the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment." Id., at 619. The source of the 
unfairness was the implicit assurance contained in Miranda 
warnings that silence will carry no penalty. 
However, Doyle is not applicable where, as here, the 
record is silent about whether defendant ever invoked the right 
to remain silent. Since there is no evidence that defendant 
remained silent, defendant's argument that the prosecutor 
violated defendant's privilege against self-incrimination by 
asking him about the alleged gun is shaky at best. Even if 
defendant had invoked the right to remain silent when 
interrogated by police, he did not remain silent when he spoke to 
his wife and Renita Duncan about what happened. As the court 
ruled, the prosecutor was merely arguing the evidence when he 
pointed out to the jury that defendant had not told others about 
the gun and that Renita Duncan, who allegedly was told why 
defendant shot Glover (T. 508) was not present to testify. 
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In United States v. Aqeef 597 F.2d 350 (3d Cir. 1979), 
the court said; 
The Supreme Court has described [the right to 
silence] as "the right to remain silent 
unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered 
exercise of his own will." The rationale 
which the Supreme Court adopted for its 
decision in Doyle was that it is 
fundamentally unfair for the prosecution to 
impose a penalty at trial on a defendant who 
has exercised that right by choosing to 
remain silent. The very statement of that 
rationale demonstrates that Doyle can have no 
application to a case in which the defendant 
did not remain silent. 
Id. at 355 (footnotes omitted). Similarly, in State v. Velarde, 
675 P.2d 1194 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court held that there 
was no prosecutorial misconduct when the prosecutor asked 
defendant on cross-examination why defendant had not told an 
arresting officer what he testified to on direct examination. 
Since there was an inconsistency between direct testimony and 
what defendant told the officer, there was a legitimate basis for 
prosecutor's testing the credibility of defendant by way of 
impeachment, and defendant had waived his Fifth Amendment 
guarantee to remain silent when he took the witness stand. Id. 
at 1195. 
In the present case, the prosecutor's comment about 
defendant not telling anybody about Grant Glover's undiscovered 
gun was not evidence offered by the state in its case in chief as 
confession by silence or evidence of guilt but rather a comment 
as to why defendant had not told the same story to his friends 
whom he admitted having spoken to, or if he did, why they did not 
tell the police that Glover had a gun. The comments went to the 
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credibility of defendant when he told a story on the witness 
stand which added a detail previously unreported to the police by 
any witness and were proper. 
Additionally, defendant alleges that the prosecutor 
violated defendant's privilege against self-incrimination in the 
following passage by stating that he failed to tell his side of 
the story until trial: 
Finally, Mr. Harrison said, yeah, that's 
true. For the first time on the stand he 
said'yep"/ I pulled the trigger. It was me. 
What Detective Johnson has known, believed 
all along, you have confirmed so easily. The 
defendant said, yep, I pulled the trigger. 
Well, why do we have to go through all that 
work? Why do we have to bring in a doctor 
and prove that Grant Glover was dead? Why 
did we have to bring in a ballistics guy to 
talk about the bullet? Why did we have to 
have John Bray come in here and say my friend 
shot him? Because until this man admitted it 
we had the burden of proving it. We have to 
be ready to prove it from the very beginning 
of the trial, not the middle. And for that, 
the State apologizes, but it's this 
representative of the State's job to make 
sure that everything possible is covered so 
that there is no doubt and that that proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is established from 
the very beginning of the trial and not just 
in the middle, because you see, the defendant 
has no obligation to say anything at all. 
(T. 634-635). There was no objection to this argument at trial. 
Where the defendant fails to object to the prosecutor's closing 
arguments, he is precluded from claiming on appeal that the 
argument was misconduct. State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 
(Utah 1989); State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1982). 
Even if defendant had objected, this passage was an explanation 
of the State's burden of proof and defendant's contrasting 
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freedom from such a burden rather than a comment on post-arrest 
silence. It was not misconduct. 
C. DEFENDANT'S REMAINING CLAIMS OF PROSECUTOR MISCONDUCT DO NOT 
MERIT REVERSAL. 
In Points III C. and D., defendant asserts that there 
were other questions and comments that constituted prosecutorial 
misconduct. Under the standards enunciated by Valdez and Troy, 
none of defendant's remaining claims amount to reversible error. 
The fact-that defense .counsel made a mistake in outlining 'ffflg 
evidence she expected to present was something the jury had no 
doubt already observed and were already wondering about. The 
jury was free to consider that defense counsel may have believed 
that Glover wore a coat in which the gun was concealed because 
that is the story defendant told to her. It in no way violated 
defendant's attorney-client privilege for the prosecutor to point 
out her mistake. Thus, the jury was not asked to consider 
anything they were not justified in considering. 
Similarly, the jury is free to speculate that a 
defendant, who sits through the entire trial before testifying, 
may alter his story to conform to the evidence after he hears the 
evidence. The prosecutor observing that fact is not engaging in 
misconduct. 
Furthermore, as defendant points out, the objection to 
the prosecutor's explanation about why Earl Tucker and Rodney 
Thomas were not called by the State was sustained. Defendant 
obtained the relief he sought. He did not request that the jury 
be further instructed about this issue nor request that they be 
told to ignore the comment. His claim that he was prejudiced is 
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undermined by his failure to request any other remedy from the 
court and is also undermined by the court's original instruction 
that the arguments of counsel are not evidence as well as the 
instruction to ignore matters where objections have been 
sustained (R. 44)• 
Finally, defendant did not object to the prosecutor's 
argument regarding Instruction No. 27 which he claims for the 
first time on appeal was improper. His argument should be 
disregarded because he failed to preserve the issue. Johnson/ 
774 P.2d at 1147; Hales, 652 P.2d at 1292. 
POINT IV 
THE GUN SEIZED FROM THE DIAPER BAG WAS 
PROPERLY ADMITTED AS THE PRODUCT OF A SEARCH 
INCIDENT TO ARREST. 
On the day of the shooting, defendant and his 
girlfriend were apprehended while walking down the street pushing 
their two small children in a stroller (M.T. 19-20, 39-40, T. 
2 302). Both defendant and Yazzie were plac€>d under arrest. A 
diaper bag located on the stroller, which the court found was 
principally in the control of Yazzie (M.T. 59), was patted down 
3 
by one of the arresting officers at the scene of the arrest 
after transporting defendant but prior to transporting Yazzie and 
the children from the scene (T. 303-05). At the time of the 
o 
"M.T." refers to the transcript of the hearing of the motion to 
suppress dated August 8, 1989. 
3 
The arresting officer testified at trial on this issue although 
she did not testify at the suppression hearing. This Court can 
apply this knowledge to the determination of whether the trial 
court's ruling was correct as the Court may affirm the ruling on 
any proper ground. State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257 (Utah 1985). 
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arrest, both defendant and Yazzie were told to lie down on the 
ground and both did so approximately 10 feet from the stroller 
(M.T. 22). At the time of the pat-down, Yazzie was handcuffed 
but had been moved closer to the stroller and was standing (T. 
306). The bag was transported separately to the station (M.T. 
42). At the station, an officer informed Det. Johnson that 
something hard that felt like a gun was inside a zippered 
compartment of the bag (M.T. 11, T. 305). Yazzie was placed in a 
room with the bag and another officer (M.T. 13, 16-17). Before 
opening the zippered compartment, Det. Johnson asked Yazzie if he 
could search the diaper bag (M.T. 15). Yazzie consented to the 
search (M.T. 15, 59). 
Defendant argued prior to trial that the bag was 
unlawfully searched at the scene and that Yazzie's later consent 
was given only because she perceived that it would have been 
useless to deny permission to search the bag which defendant 
claims had already been searched. The trial court refused to 
suppress the gun. 
Arguably, the trial court ruled that defendant lacked 
standing to object to the search of the diaper bag. Both 
defendant and Yazzie testified that the bag belonged to their 
daughters rather than to them. Defendant testified that he used 
the bag when he changed the children's diapers. Judge Young 
found that the bag was "principally the property of Ms. Yazzie" 
(M.T. 59). If the bag was the property of Ms. Yazzie, defendant 
did not have standing to object to the search unless defendant 
established some privacy interest in the bag and this Court need 
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not consider any other basis for upholding the trial court's 
denial of the motion to suppress. Rakas v. Illinois/ 439 U.S. 
128, 131 n.l (1978); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334, 1335 (Utah 
1984). Judge Young did not articulate that he found defendant 
had any privacy interest in the bag. Therefore, this Court 
should conclude that defendant lacked standing. 
On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court erred 
in admitting the gun based upon Yazzie's consent to the search 
because he claims that the consent was involuntary. His argument 
centers upon his version of the facts in which he claims that the 
arresting officer opened the zippered compartment at the scene, 
that Yazzie witnessed this and that she believed there was no 
point in refusing consent because the bag had already been 
searched. Defendant states that the arresting officer never 
testified at trial that she did not open the zippered compartment 
at the scene. App. Br. at 35 n.24. Thus, he appears to claim 
that the officer must have opened the zipper. The trial 
testimony is not subject to the interpretation defendant wishes 
to place upon it. However, this point is meaningless because the 
officer could have opened the zipper in a search incident to 
4 
arrest under the authorities cited below. 
4
 At trial Officer Ericka MacPherson testified that she could see 
inside the open bag as it sat on the stroller (T. 303). 
MacPherson looked inside the open compartment of the bag and felt 
with her hand for anything that could be used as a weapon (T. 
304). As she did so, she felt with the back of her hand 
something hard and obviously shaped like a weapon in the separate 
zippered compartment (T. 304). The dialogue continued: 
Q Were you able to see it? 
A No, it was zippered. 
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In State v. Houserf 669 P.2d 437 (Utah 1983), the Utah 
Supreme Court approved a search of a backpack in the possession 
of an arrested person incident to the arrest. In this case, the 
diaper bag was primarily in the possession of Jacqueline Yazzie 
who was arrested at the time of the search. Thus, the search was 
proper as a search incident to arrest. Many courts have upheld 
searches incident to arrest of closed containers in the 
possession of the arrestee especially when the container is 
immediately associated with the arrestee and where the arrest 
occurred on a public street and the container is not going to be 
left behind. See generally LaFavef Search and Seizure § 5.5(a) 
(2d ed. 1987). The search in this case was constitutional as a 
search incident to arrest and the trial court's ruling may be 
upheld on this basis even though the court chose to base its 
ruling on the subsequent consent. State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 
260 (Utah 1985) (appellate court may affirm ruling of trial court 
4 
Cont. 
Q Okay. How did you determine that it was 
in the shape of a weapon if you could not see 
it? 
A By the feel; by the shape of it. It's a 
very thin plastic bag. 
Q And after you felt that what did you do? 
A I immediately notified Lieutenant Tom 
Brown who was at the scene and gave the bag 
to him. 
Q Did you ever see the bag again? 
A No. 
(T. 305). This passage clearly indicates that Officer 
MacPherson did not open the zipper of the bag although she was 
not expressly asked that question. 
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on any proper ground). 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
ON THE DEFINITION OF REASONABLE DOUBT. 
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in 
rejecting defendant's reasonable doubt instruction. 
Specifically, defendant complains that the court's instruction to 
the jury was "circular and unhelpful" (Br. of App. at 40). 
Further, defendant argues.vthat the trial court/s^instruction was 
inadequate because it "left the jurors without concrete 
understanding of the incomparable significance of their decision 
to take another's freedom" (Br. of App. at 42). Defendant's 
position appears to be that the trial court was required to give 
his instruction because he liked it language better than he liked 
the instruction the court gave. His position is without merit. 
While the Utah Supreme Court has expressed concern 
about including certain terms in reasonable doubt instructions, 
the Court has never mandated that particular language be 
included. State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147-49 (Utah 1989) (concurring 
opinions of J. Stewart and J. Zimmerman). Instead, the standard 
remains that jury instructions must be construed as a whole; and, 
a conviction will be overturned only if a defendant can show that 
he was prejudiced by the instruction such that the outcome of the 
case would likely have been different. Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1146 
and 1149. Accord Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 
(1954) (reasonable doubt instruction may be misleading standing 
alone, but acceptable when read as a whole with other jury 
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instructions); United States v. Hallf 854 F.2d 1036, 1039 (7th 
Cir. 1988) (no constitutional infringement occurs where 
instructions as a whole properly instructed the jury as to 
defendant's presumption of innocence and the government's burden 
of proof). 
Further, it is the exclusive province of the trial 
court to instruct the jury on relevant law. 
Accordingly, the judge may, over the 
objection of.the defendant's counsel, give 
any instruction that is in proper form/ 
states the law correctly, and does not 
prejudice the defendant. State v. Piper, 113 
Ariz. 390, 393, 555 P.2d 636, 639 (1976). 
However, all instructions are subject to the 
general and overreaching rule that the judge 
must make it clear to the jury that the 
defendant has "no particular burden of proof 
but [is] entitled to an acquittal if there 
[is] any basis in the evidence from either 
side sufficient to create a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant [is] guilty of the 
offense." State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 
(Utah 1980). . .. 
State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1986). As noted in 
Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1146, jury instructions must be construed as 
a whole. Here, the trial court fully and correctly instructed 
the jury that the State must prove the allegations contained in 
the Information beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 109, Instruction 
No. 3); that the State carried the burden of proving all 
essential elements of the crime charged (R. 124, Instruction No. 
19); and that the jurors could find defendant guilty of 
manslaughter, a lesser included offense, if the evidence 
established the elements beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 126-127, 
Instruction No. 21) along with the requisite intent (R. 129, 
Instruction No. 23). Thus, the jury was instructed on numerous 
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occasions that defendant bore no burden of proof and that it was 
incumbent upon the State to establish defendant's guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Turning to the language of the reasonable doubt 
instruction itself, the instruction was proper. The trial court 
instructed the jury that: 
All presumptions of law, independent of 
evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a 
defendant is presumed innocent until he is 
proven.guilty.beyond a reasonable doubt. And 
in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether 
his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is 
entitled to an acquittal. 
I have heretofore told you that the 
burden is upon the state to prove the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not 
require proof to an absolute certainty. Now 
by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is 
based on reason and is reasonable in view of 
all the evidence. It must be a reasonable 
doubt and not a doubt which is merely 
fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly 
speculative possibility. Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is that degree of proof 
which satisfies the mind, convinces the 
understanding of those who are bound to act 
conscientiously upon it and obviates all 
reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a 
doubt which reasonable men and women would 
entertain, and it must arise from the 
evidence or lack of evidence in this case. 
(R, 112, Instruction No. 7). The first paragraph of this 
instruction is not attacked by defendant as it is identical to 
the first paragraph of defendant's requested instruction. The 
language is a correct and unequivocal statement of the 
presumption of innocence. See Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1380. 
The first line of the second paragraph is also identical to 
defendant's requested instruction and merely restates that the 
State has the burden of proof. 
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The second sentence of the second paragraph: "proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute 
certainty," must be read with the fourth sentence: "It must be a 
reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is merely fanciful or 
imaginary or based on wholly speculative possibility." Together, 
the language establishes, as recognized by the Utah Supreme 
Court, that "a fanciful or wholly speculative possibility ought 
not to defeat proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Johnson, 774 
P.2d at 1149 (concurring opinion of J. Stewart). 
The third sentence of the second paragraph: "Now by 
reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is based on reason and one 
which is reasonable in view of all the evidence," is identical to 
language used and approved of in State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 
572 (Utah 1987). It is also identical to the second sentence of 
the second paragraph of defendant's proposed instruction (R. 91). 
Defendant apparently finds some error in this language in the 
given instruction because he underlined it in his brief at page 
40. He provided, however, no specific reason why this passage is 
objectionable. 
The first part of the fifth sentence, "Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which satisfies the 
mind, convinces the understanding of those who are bound to act 
conscientiously upon it. . .," is identical to that approved of 
in Tillman, 750 P.2d at 572, and favorably reviewed in Johnson, 
774 P.2d at 1145-1146. The second part of the sentence, "and 
obviates all reasonable doubt," is in conformity with Justice 
Stewart's observation that "the instruction should specifically 
-35-
state the State's proof must obviate all reasonable doubt." 
Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1381 (dissenting opinion of J. Stewart). 
The last sentence of the instruction, "A reasonable doubt is a 
doubt which reasonable men and women would entertain, and it must 
arise from the evidence or the lack of the evidence in this 
case," was approved in both Tillman, 750 P.2d at 572-573, and 
Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1145-46. 
The trial court rejected the following instruction 
proposed by defendant: 
All presumptions of law, independent of 
evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a 
defendant is presumed innocent until he is 
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And 
in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether 
a defendant's guilt is satisfactorily shown, 
he or she is entitled to an acquittal. 
I have heretofore told you that the 
burden in upon the State to prove the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Now by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that 
is based on reason and one which is 
reasonable in view of all the evidence. A 
reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable 
men and women would entertain, and it must 
arise from the evidence or the lack of 
evidence in this case. 
If, after an impartial consideration and 
comparison of all the evidence in the case, 
you can candidly say that you have the kind 
of doubt which would cause a person to 
hesitate to act, you have a reasonable doubt. 
Deciding that someone has committed a 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt is different 
from making decisions concerning the more 
weighty affairs of life. In such affairs of 
life, a person looks forward and, based on a 
degree of hope, determination and personal 
resolve, makes a decision that involves a 
degree of risk. However, this decision is 
revocable or at least salvageable. 
A decision to convict or not looks 
backward. It is always irrevocable as to 
your decision. It demands reason, 
impartiality and common sense. You must have 
a greater assurance of correctness of this 
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decision than you normally have in making the 
weighty decisions in your life. 
(R. 90-91). The essential difference between defendant's 
instruction and the given instruction is that defendant's 
instruction includes language distinguishing between making 
decisions concerning the more weighty affairs of life and a 
decision to convict. This view was articulated by Justice 
Stewart in his dissenting opinion in State v. Ireland/ 773 P.2d 
1375,. 13a0 (Utah 1989), explaining his dislike, of the instruction 
given in that case. 
Defendant appears to contend that Justice Stewart's 
disapproval of the "more weighty affairs of life" language, 
previously included routinely in reasonable doubt instructions, 
requires the trial court to explain to the jury that language 
they have never heard should not be used to define the decision 
they are about to make. This position is indefensible. 
Defendant's instruction is less illuminating than the instruction 
given by the trial court. It introduces to the jury language 
which has been disapproved only to tell the jury not to apply it 
to their deliberations. Further, the "irrevocable" reference 
might mislead the jury to conclude that the defendant is without 
any remedy, such as a new trial, an appeal or parole. 
"[T]here is no apparent reason to mandate that one, and 
only one, particular instruction be used by trial judges in 
conveying to the jury the meaning of the elusive phrase, 'proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211 (Utah 
1980). Taken as a whole, the court's instructions to the jury 
placed the burden of proof on the State to prove all elements of 
-37-
the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. The instructions were 
sufficient and rejection of defendant's instruction was, 
therefore, not error. State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1146, 1149; 
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-920 (Utah 1987). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to affirm the evidentiary rulings of the lower court and to 
affirm defendant's conviction. 
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